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______________ 
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______________ 
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                                                            Appellant 
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POTTSVILLE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT 
__________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3-10-cv-00855) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 13, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and  
ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This case arises under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA), a federal statute requiring states that 
receive federal education funding to ensure that disabled 
children receive a ―free appropriate public education‖ (FAPE).  
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).  The statute ―protects the rights of 
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disabled children by mandating that public educational 
institutions identify and effectively educate those children, or 
pay for their education elsewhere if they require specialized 
services that the public institution cannot provide.‖  D.K. v. 
Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
P.P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 735 (3d Cir. 
2009)).  Appellant Muhammad Munir sent his son, O.M., to a 
private residential facility and a private boarding school 
following multiple suicide attempts, and sought reimbursement 
for the cost of those placements from the Pottsville Area School 
District (Pottsville or School District).  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the District Court‘s order denying that 
request. 
I 
 To comply with the IDEA, school districts must identify 
and evaluate all children who they have reason to believe are 
disabled under the statute.  D.K., 696 F.3d at 244.  Once a 
school district has identified a child as eligible for IDEA 
services, it must create and implement an Individualized 
Education Plan (IEP) based on the student‘s needs and areas of 
disability.  P.P., 585 F.3d at 729–30.  School districts are not, 
however, required to ―maximize the potential‖ of each 
handicapped student.  T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 
F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick 
Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 197 n.21 
(1982)).  Instead, to satisfy the IDEA, the district must offer an 
IEP that is ―reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
meaningful educational benefits in light of the student‘s 
intellectual potential.‖  P.P., 585 F.3d at 729–30 (quoting Shore 
Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 
2004)); see also Mary T. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 575 F.3d 235, 
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240 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that once the school district has 
designed and administered an IEP that is reasonably calculated 
to enable the receipt of meaningful educational benefits, it has 
satisfied its obligation to provide the child with a FAPE). 
 If parents believe that the school district is not providing 
a FAPE for their child, they may unilaterally remove him from 
the school, enroll him in a different school, and seek tuition 
reimbursement for the cost of the alternative placement.  Id. at 
242 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) and Sch. Comm. of 
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985)).  
Parents who change their child‘s placement without the consent 
of state or local officials, however, ―do so at their own financial 
risk.‖  Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373–74.  A court may grant the 
family tuition reimbursement only if it finds that the school 
district failed to provide a FAPE and that the alternative private 
placement was appropriate.  See Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four 
v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15–16 (1993); Mary T., 575 F.3d at 242.  
Courts also have broad discretion to consider equitable factors 
when awarding tuition reimbursement.  Florence Cnty. Sch. 
Dist., 510 U.S. at 15–16. 
II 
A 
 O.M. is a 21-year-old former Pottsville student who was 
diagnosed as suffering from emotional disturbance.  He first 
required in-patient hospital treatment for making threats of 
suicide and suicidal gestures in 2005, when he was enrolled in 
middle school.  At that time, the School District conducted a 
psycho-educational evaluation to determine whether O.M. 
suffered from a learning disability and would be eligible for 
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IDEA services.  It determined that O.M. was not eligible for 
learning disability services based on his cognitive and 
achievement test scores.  It determined that he was not eligible 
for emotional disturbance services based on behavioral ratings 
completed by teachers and a psychiatric report.   
 O.M. returned to Pottsville in the fall of 2005 and 
performed well academically for three years.  He had no 
problem with attendance, expressed no concerns about school, 
and received grades in the A to C range in regular college 
preparatory courses.
1
  During the 2005-2006 school year, O.M. 
periodically saw the school psychologist, who observed nothing 
suggesting that an additional evaluation for IDEA services was 
necessary. 
 In April 2008, O.M. took an overdose of prescription 
medication and was hospitalized.  Although his parents notified 
the School District about the incident, they did not provide it 
with details or medical records.  O.M. also was hospitalized 
twice in the summer of 2008 for making suicidal threats and 
gestures and attempting suicide.  The first hospitalization 
occurred after an incident with his high school football coach 
during a summer practice session; the second occurred during a 
family trip to the university that O.M.‘s sibling attended. 
 Following the very difficult summer O.M. experienced, 
in August 2008, O.M.‘s parents notified the School District that 
they were going to enroll him in the private boarding school that 
his brother had attended.  The School District assisted in this 
                                                 
 
1
 In the 2007-2008 school year, for example, O.M. 
received two A‘s, three B‘s, and two C‘s. 
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effort by writing letters of recommendation for O.M. and 
supplying teacher evaluation forms.  O.M.‘s guidance counselor, 
who submitted a very positive letter of recommendation, noted 
that O.M. was ranked 62 out of a class of 278.  O.M. was 
accepted, but after his first day the boarding school notified his 
parents that he felt depressed and had thoughts of harming 
himself, and it required his parents to take him home. 
 After his withdrawal from boarding school, O.M. 
reenrolled at Pottsville Area High School.  His behavior and 
performance at school were, for the most part, unremarkable.  
He initially decided to take honors math classes, but began 
struggling academically and dropped them.  When he returned to 
regular college preparatory courses, his grades improved.  On at 
least two occasions after O.M. returned, he became upset and 
spoke to the guidance counselor, and his parents were required 
to pick him up from school.  Otherwise, O.M. generally attended 
and participated in his classes, and he was observed spending his 
lunch and free periods socializing with students who were 
considered popular. 
 O.M.‘s mental health problems continued, however.  In 
early September 2008, he again expressed suicidal ideation and 
had to be hospitalized.  His parents notified the School District 
and requested an IEP for their son.  In response, the School 
District requested and received permission from O.M.‘s parents 
to conduct an evaluation to determine whether he was a 
protected handicapped student under § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act, and, if so, what services he needed.
2
  O.M. was hospitalized 
                                                 
2 The Rehabilitation Act ―prohibits discrimination in 
federally-funded programs, including public schools, on the 
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again in November 2008.  In mid-November, the School District 
created a Rehabilitation Act § 504 plan for O.M., which O.M.‘s 
parents approved.
3
  The School District did not, however, create 
an IEP. 
 In January 2009, O.M. again threatened suicide and was 
hospitalized for treatment.  When he was released, his parents 
enrolled him at Wediko Children‘s Services, a therapeutic 
residential treatment center in New Hampshire, for the rest of 
the school year.  While there, O.M. received daily individual and 
group therapy, during which he received training in social skills, 
emotional regulation, stress management, and conflict 
resolution.  Wediko also offered a full school day with a 
curriculum that met New Hampshire‘s educational standards, 
which O.M. began attending about two to three weeks after his 
enrollment.  The classes were small and graded on a pass-fail 
basis, and the school day included three debriefing periods to 
assess how well O.M. was maintaining control of his thoughts, 
mood, and anxiety. 
                                                                                                             
basis of disability.‖  Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 265 
n.1 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794). 
 
3
 O.M.‘s § 504 plan provided for the following services 
and accommodations: positive reinforcement from teachers; 
preferential seating; directions repeated verbally; extra time to 
complete time-sensitive tasks when needed; and permission to 
take tests in a quiet setting when needed.  The plan also 
provided that O.M. would ask for help from teachers and use 
available tutoring services and guidance services when 
necessary. 
8 
 
 Wediko conducted an evaluation of O.M. in February 
2009.  The evaluation consisted of standardized cognitive and 
academic achievement tests and measures designed to test 
social-emotional functioning.  Wediko notified the School 
District of the results and recommended that the District 
consider an IEP for O.M.  The District reviewed Wediko‘s 
analysis, which indicated that O.M. was in the average range of 
intellectual functioning, with average to above average scores in 
math, reading, and writing, and accepted Wediko‘s diagnosis of 
emotional disturbance.
4
 
 In May 2009, the School District offered an IEP for 
O.M., which included annual goals and provided for emotional 
support services.  In September 2009, the School District added 
a cognitive-behavioral curriculum for students experiencing 
anxiety and depression.  It also increased social work services 
and added psychological services.  Although these proposals 
incorporated most of Wediko‘s recommendations, O.M.‘s 
parents rejected the IEP because it did not provide O.M. with 
small classes or the same types of counseling services that he 
was receiving at Wediko.  O.M. completed the school year at 
Wediko. 
 Before the start of the 2009-2010 school year, O.M.‘s 
parents decided that his risk level had decreased to the point 
where he could function in a less intensive environment.  
Accordingly, O.M.‘s parents decided to send him to The Phelps 
School, a residential school located in Malvern, Pennsylvania, 
and licensed by the Pennsylvania Department of Education.  
                                                 
 
4
 The School District rejected Wediko‘s conclusion that 
O.M. had a non-verbal learning disability. 
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Phelps was closer to home and offered small classes and a 
supportive environment. 
B 
 O.M.‘s parents filed a due process complaint in August 
2009 with the Office of Dispute Resolution, and a hearing was 
conducted by a Pennsylvania Special Hearing Officer.  O.M.‘s 
parents alleged that the School District had failed to conduct a 
timely evaluation of O.M. and provide specialized educational 
services, in violation of the IDEA.  They sought: 
(1) compensatory education for the time period between the fall 
of 2007 and December 2008; and (2) reimbursement for the cost 
of O.M.‘s placements at Wediko and Phelps. 
 The Hearing Officer issued a written administrative 
decision and order denying relief on January 23, 2010.  She 
concluded that the School District had no obligation to evaluate 
O.M. or provide him with specialized educational services 
between 2005 and spring of 2008 because, although the record 
suggested that O.M. was emotionally disturbed, there was no 
evidence that O.M.‘s condition was affecting his ability to learn 
at that time.  The Hearing Officer remarked that whether the 
School District had an obligation to evaluate O.M. and provide 
him with specialized services in the fall of 2008, after it learned 
of his September and November suicide attempts, was a closer 
question.  Nevertheless, she determined that even if the School 
District had committed a procedural violation of the IDEA, that 
violation had no substantive effect, as O.M. was placed at 
Wediko before the School District would have had time to 
complete an evaluation, develop an IEP, and begin to provide 
services.  Because the School District‘s delay did not actually 
deprive O.M. of an educational benefit, O.M. was not entitled to 
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an award of compensatory education for that period. 
 The Hearing Officer then considered whether O.M.‘s 
parents were entitled to compensation for the costs of private 
placement at Wediko or Phelps.  Relying on Mary T. v. School 
District of Philadelphia, 575 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2009), she 
determined that they were not entitled to reimbursement for the 
costs of attending Wediko because the primary purpose of that 
placement was the provision of mental health treatment rather 
than provision of special education.  She explained that O.M. 
was placed at Wediko because of ―a medical/mental health crisis 
that required immediate treatment.‖  App. 59.  This finding was 
supported by the testimony of O.M.‘s father and witnesses from 
Wediko, who ―emphasized that Student needed to attend 
Wediko in order to keep him safe from the effects of his 
depression, which led to suicide threats and gestures when he 
was living at home.‖  App. 60.  She also noted that the services 
O.M. received while at Wediko were based on a treatment plan 
designed by a clinical psychologist and were not focused 
primarily on education.   
 Finally, the Hearing Officer determined that O.M.‘s 
parents were not entitled to compensation for the costs of 
attending Phelps because, at the time that O.M. went there, the 
District had proposed an IEP that met all of O.M.‘s educational 
needs.  Although O.M.‘s parents opined that O.M. could benefit 
from smaller class sizes and counseling services such as those 
provided by the private schools, the Hearing Officer explained 
that, under the IDEA, O.M. ―is entitled to an appropriate 
program, not an ideal program.‖  App. 60. 
 On April 21, 2010, Munir appealed the Hearing Officer‘s 
decision by filing a complaint in the United States District Court 
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for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  The District Court 
adopted the factual findings of the Hearing Officer, applied the 
same legal analysis, and granted summary judgment in favor of 
the School District.
5
  Munir filed this timely appeal, challenging 
only the District Court‘s denial of his request for tuition 
reimbursement. 
III 
 The District Court had jurisdiction in this matter under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 In deciding cases brought under the IDEA, district courts 
apply a modified version of de novo review.  L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. 
of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2006).  Although the 
District Court must make its own findings by a preponderance of 
the evidence, it is also required to afford due weight to the 
factual findings of the hearing officer.  Id.  ―The ‗due weight‘ 
standard requires the court to consider the factual findings from 
the administrative proceedings prima facie correct and, if the 
court fails to adopt those findings, it must explain its reasons for 
departing from them.‖  Mary T., 575 F.3d at 241 (quoting Shore, 
                                                 
 
5
 During the District Court proceedings, both Munir and 
the School District supplemented the administrative record with 
their own reports as to whether the IEPs offered by the School 
District were adequate.  The District Court found that these 
reports ―amounted to little more than a quasi-judicial type 
review of the administrative findings,‖ and provided no ―basis to 
abrogate the findings of fact listed by ALJ Carroll in her 
Decision.‖  App. 27. 
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381 F.3d at 199) (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted).  We exercise plenary review over the District Court‘s 
legal conclusions and review its factual findings for clear error.  
L.E., 435 F.3d at 389. 
IV 
 On appeal, Munir argues that he is entitled to 
reimbursement for the costs of O.M.‘s tuition at Wediko and 
Phelps.  To be entitled to reimbursement, Munir must show that 
the School District failed to provide O.M. with a FAPE and that 
the alternative private placement was appropriate.  See Florence 
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 510 U.S. at 15–16; Mary T., 575 F.3d at 242.  
For placement at a residential program to be ―appropriate,‖ the 
program must itself be proper under the IDEA—that is, it must 
―provide[] significant learning and confer[] meaningful benefit.‖ 
 Mary T., 575 F.3d at 242 (quoting Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. 
DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 276 (3d Cir. 2007)).  The court must 
also find that the residential program is the sort of program that 
the public school should have taken financial responsibility for 
in the first place.  See, e.g., id. at 243–44 (considering whether 
the school district should have initially been financially 
responsible for the placement in determining whether a 
placement was ―appropriate‖ for purposes of reimbursement); 
see also Butler v. Evans, 225 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(same).
6
 
                                                 
 
6
 We have previously recognized that ―parents of a 
disabled student need not seek out the perfect private placement 
in order to satisfy IDEA.‖  Mary T., 575 F.3d at 242 (quoting 
Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249 n.8 (3d Cir. 
1999)).  A private placement may, for example, be ―appropriate‖ 
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 The District Court determined that Munir was not entitled 
to reimbursement for the costs of O.M.‘s attendance at Wediko 
because he could not meet the second prong of the test.  That is, 
O.M.‘s placement at Wediko was not an ―appropriate‖ 
placement because he was placed at Wediko to treat his mental 
health needs, and any educational benefit that he received was 
incidental.  The Court further determined that Munir was not 
entitled to reimbursement for the costs of attending Phelps 
because the first prong of the test had not been met—when O.M. 
was enrolled at Phelps, the School District had offered him an 
IEP that would meet his educational needs.  Because we 
perceive no error in the Hearing Officer‘s comprehensive 
decision or in the District Court‘s thorough review of the case, 
we will affirm. 
A 
 O.M.‘s parents enrolled him at Wediko in January 2009, 
after he received in-patient treatment following a suicide 
attempt, and O.M. stayed at Wediko through July 2009.  Munir 
seeks reimbursement for the costs of this placement, which 
amounted to $68,752.61.   
                                                                                                             
even if the private school fails ―to provide an IEP or meet state 
educational standards.‖  Id. at 242 (citing Florence, 510 U.S. at 
14–15).  But if a school district would not have been required to 
provide the child with residential treatment before the child was 
withdrawn from public school, it does not become financially 
responsible for that placement when parents make the unilateral 
decision to enroll their child at a residential facility.  This is true 
even when the school district may have failed in some other 
respect to provide the child with a FAPE. 
14 
 
 Munir argues that the School District violated the 
procedures set out by the IDEA when it failed to offer O.M. an 
IEP until May 2009,
7
 and that the IEP the School District 
offered then was inadequate.  He argues that, as a result of the 
School District‘s violations, O.M. was denied a FAPE during 
the 2008-2009 school year.  He further claims that full-time 
residential treatment was a ―necessary ingredient to learning,‖ so 
O.M.‘s placement at Wediko from January 2009 to July 2009 
was ―appropriate.‖  Munir Br. at 52. 
  School districts are responsible for the costs of a 
disabled child‘s placement in a residential program when that 
placement is ―necessary to provide special education and related 
services.‖  34 C.F.R. § 300.104.  Residential placement may be 
necessary when the disabled child needs a highly structured 
environment in order to obtain any kind of educational benefit.  
For example, in Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, 
642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981), we explained that the appropriate 
educational goals for a child with severe mental disabilities and 
cerebral palsy included the development of ―basic self-help and 
                                                 
 
7 
Munir contends that the School District should have 
identified O.M. as disabled ―as early as 2005, and no later than 
September of 2008‖ because of his hospitalizations.  Munir Br. 
at 34.  But Munir did not present any evidence that O.M.‘s 
condition adversely affected his educational progress during that 
time.  Indeed, as the Hearing Officer noted, Munir testified that 
O.M. had no problem with attendance and did not express any 
concern about attending school during that period.  Munir also 
argues that that the School District had an obligation to evaluate 
O.M. and develop an IEP at some point after September 2008, 
when he requested an evaluation. 
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social skills such as toilet training.‖  Id. at 693 (quoting Battle v. 
Commonwealth of Pa., 629 F.2d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 1980)).  
However, the child suffered from emotional problems that 
prevented him from achieving those goals; when he experienced 
stress, he would induce choking and vomiting, which 
―interfere[d] fundamentally with his ability to learn.‖  Id. at 694. 
 The student needed consistency of programming and 
environment to meet his educational goals because of his 
emotional problems, and we thus found that the school district 
was responsible for the costs of the residential program.  Id. at 
694, 696.
8
 
                                                 
8 Similarly, in Independent School District No. 284 v. 
A.C., 258 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2001), the Eighth Circuit found that 
residential treatment was warranted because it was necessary to 
directly address the child‘s educational problems.  There, the 
child suffered from emotional and behavioral disorders that 
manifested themselves in ―classroom disruption, profanity, 
insubordination, and truancy.‖  Id. at 771.  Evaluations of the 
student suggested that these disorders were interfering with her 
academic progress and that she needed a highly structured 
program in order to benefit from educational instruction.  See id. 
at 772.  Because the child‘s emotional and behavioral disorders 
―need[ed] to be addressed in order for [her] to learn,‖ and 
because evaluations suggested that a residential program would 
be the only effective way of treating those problems, the Eighth 
Circuit concluded that residential placement was appropriate.  
Id. at 777; see also Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 
1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997) (residential placement appropriate in 
light of student‘s ―stalled academic performance‖ and the 
determination that the student‘s ―debilitating emotional 
problems could only be properly addressed in a highly structured 
16 
 
 School districts are not, however, financially responsible 
for the placement of students who need twenty-four-hour 
supervision for medical, social, or emotional reasons, and 
receive only an incidental educational benefit from that 
placement.  See Mary T., 575 F.3d at 245–46; Kruelle, 642 F.2d 
at 693 (―Analysis must focus . . . on whether full-time placement 
may be considered necessary for educational purposes, or 
whether the residential placement is a response to medical, 
social or emotional problems that are segregable from the 
learning process.‖).  In determining whether schools should be 
held financially responsible for the costs of residential 
placement, courts must consider whether the service is necessary 
to ensure that the child receives some educational benefit, and 
they must assess the strength of the link between that service 
and the child‘s educational needs.  Mary T., 575 F.3d at 244 
(citing Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 694). 
 Applying this analysis in Mary T., we determined that 
there was an insufficient link between the child‘s placement in a 
long-term psychiatric facility and her educational needs.  There, 
the child suffered from psychotic events, severe anger problems, 
substance abuse, and self-harming behavior.  575 F.3d at 239.  
She had previously been placed in a residential educational 
facility and a psychiatric hospital, but neither of those facilities 
was able to provide appropriate care.  Id.  Although the long-
term psychiatric facility at which she was subsequently placed 
was an accredited rehabilitation facility, it did not have any 
                                                                                                             
residential setting‖); Taylor v. Honig, 910 F.2d 627, 632–33 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (student placed in special educational school to treat 
severe emotional disturbance that was interfering with his ability 
to learn). 
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educational accreditation, nor did it have an on-site school, 
special education teachers, or school affiliation; the child spent 
most of her time there in intensive individual and group therapy. 
 Id.  Although we recognized that the child may have received 
some educational benefit from her therapy sessions, those 
sessions were ―predominately designed to make her aware of her 
medical condition and how to respond to it‖; they were ―neither 
intended nor designed to be responsive to the child‘s distinct 
‗learning needs.‘‖  Id. at 245.  Therefore, the parents were not 
eligible for reimbursement. 
 Other courts of appeals have reached similar results when 
the services were directed primarily at the child‘s medical or 
emotional needs, rather than the child‘s educational needs.  In 
Clovis Unified School District v. California Office of 
Administrative Hearings, 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990), for 
example, a student suffering from serious emotional problems 
was also placed in an acute care psychiatric hospital providing 
few educational services, and her parents sought reimbursement 
for that placement.  Id. at 639.  In assessing the link between the 
child‘s educational needs and the placement, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the services provided by the hospital were not 
primarily provided to allow the student to benefit from her 
education, but instead were excludable medical expenses.  Id. at 
645; see also Butler, 225 F.3d at 894–95 (finding that parents 
were not entitled to reimbursement for hospitalization because 
―education was not the purpose of her hospitalization,‖ and 
explaining that ―[u]nlike in-school nursing in Cedar Rapids, 
Niki‘s inpatient medical care was necessary in itself and was not 
a special accommodation made necessary only to allow her to 
attend school or receive education‖). 
 Unlike the students in Mary T. and Clovis, O.M. was 
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placed at a facility that did offer an educational component.  
Wediko‘s residential treatment program included a full school 
day, with a curriculum that met New Hampshire‘s educational 
standards.  O.M. began attending those classes about two to 
three weeks after his admission.  In addition to academic 
classes, the school day included three debriefing periods for 
assessing how well O.M. was maintaining control of thoughts, 
mood, and anxiety.  The District Court recognized that O.M. 
―undoubtedly benefitted‖ from this educational program.   
 The relevant question, however, is whether O.M. had to 
attend a residential facility because of his educational needs—
because, for example, he would have been incapable of learning 
in a less structured environment—or rather, if he required 
residential placement to treat medical or mental health needs 
segregable from his educational needs.  Mary T., 575 F.3d at 
243–44 (private placement must be ―necessary for educational 
purposes,‖ as opposed to ―a response to medical, social or 
emotional problems that are segregable from the learning 
process‖ (quoting Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 693) (emphasis added)); 
cf. 34 C.F.R. § 300.104 (schools must bear the costs of 
placement in a residential program when such placement ―is 
necessary to provide special education and related services to a 
child with a disability‖).  The fact that a particular residential 
facility does not even offer educational programs may be strong 
evidence that the child was placed there to meet his medical or 
emotional needs.  See Mary T., 575 F.3d at 245–46 (explaining 
that the facility‘s lack of educational accreditation and on-site 
educators ―further demonstrated‖ that the child‘s placement was 
not educational).  Conversely, the fact that classes are offered 
may provide evidence that the purpose of the placement is, in 
fact, educational.  But O.M.‘s participation in some educational 
programs at Wediko does not conclusively establish that the 
19 
 
purpose of his placement there was educational.  Other factors—
such as evaluations of the student‘s actual educational needs,9 or 
evidence of a psychiatric crisis prompting the placement
10—
should also be considered. 
 Here, O.M. was enrolled at Wediko to meet his mental 
health needs, and any educational benefit he received from the 
Wediko placement was incidental.  The placement at Wediko 
was prompted by a medical emergency.  His parents ―feared for 
his personal safety,‖ and they enrolled him at Wediko ―in order 
to prevent him from harming himself.‖  Munir v. Pottsville Area 
Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 2194543, at *15 (M.D. Pa. June 14, 2012). 
 Thus, although O.M. did attend specialized classes while at 
Wediko, services there were more medical than educational.  Id. 
 Indeed, O.M. was an above-average student at Pottsville, who 
                                                 
 
9
 See, e.g., Clovis, 903 F.2d at 645 (remarking that the 
student‘s program at the hospital ―was implemented not by the 
[IEP] designed by the school system, but was instead determined 
by a medical team, supervised by a licensed physician‖). 
 
10
 See, e.g., Butler, 225 F.3d at 893 (noting, in finding 
that the school district was not financially responsible for the 
student‘s placement, that the student‘s ―hospitalization was 
prompted by a psychiatric crisis‖); Taylor, 910 F.2d at 633 
(explaining, in finding that placement at a special educational 
school was appropriate, that ―[t]he placement was not ordered in 
response to any medical crisis; on the contrary, the IEP 
developed on May 9, 1988 stated that Todd was ‗medically 
stable‘ and that a state hospital was inappropriate for him‖); 
Clovis, 903 F.2d at 645 (child‘s hospitalization was in response 
to a medical crisis). 
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had no serious problem with attendance and socialized well with 
other students.  Because O.M.‘s parents have not shown that 
they placed O.M. at Wediko in order to meet his specialized 
educational needs, the District Court correctly determined that 
they are not entitled to reimbursement.
11
 
B 
 Munir also challenges the District Court‘s determination 
that he was not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of tuition 
at Phelps during the 2009-2010 school year, which amounted to 
$42,100.  O.M. was placed at Phelps after his parents rejected 
the IEP proposed by the School District in May 2009.  O.M.‘s 
parents also rejected a second IEP in September 2009 because it 
did not provide certain services that they believed would be 
beneficial—in particular, smaller class sizes and the type of 
counseling services that had been available at Wediko. 
 As noted previously, parents are only entitled to tuition 
reimbursement when the school district has failed to offer a 
FAPE.  School districts are required to offer an IEP that is 
―reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful 
educational benefits in light of the student‘s intellectual 
potential.‖  P.P., 585 F.3d at 729−30 (quoting Shore Reg’l High 
Sch., 381 F.3d at 198).  They are not, however, required to 
―maximize the potential‖ of each handicapped student.  T.R., 
205 F.3d at 577 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n.21). 
                                                 
 
11
 Because we find that the District Court did not err in 
holding that Wediko was not an ―appropriate placement,‖ we 
need not address Munir‘s claims relating to alleged procedural 
violations committed by the school district. 
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 The District Court did not err in determining that the IEP 
offered by the School District in May and September 2009 
satisfied the School District‘s obligations under the IDEA.  In 
designing O.M.‘s IEPs, the School District took into account 
Wediko‘s evaluation of O.M. and ―incorporated virtually all of 
the Wediko recommendations.‖  Munir, 2012 WL 2194543, at 
*9.  The District Court recognized that smaller classes and more 
emotional support might ―contribute to [O.M.‘s] ability to learn 
more easily,‖ id. at *16, but it determined that neither was 
necessary to ensure that O.M. received meaningful educational 
benefits.  Munir has not shown that this conclusion was clearly 
erroneous. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
